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CASES NOTED
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - RULING BASED ON HEARSAY
EVIDENCE
The unemployment compensation agency mailed plaintiff a notice of
ineligibility. After the statutory time for appeal lapsed, plaintiff filed an
appeal claiming she had not received the notice. The agency's board of
review found the notice had been mailed, basing its decision on hearsay evi-
dence. Held, hearsay may be received in evidence by an administrative
agency, but it cannot form the sole basis for a decision. Borgia v. Board of
Review, 91 A.2d 441 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1952).
As a general rule, administrative agencies are not bound by technical
rules of evidence unless so provided by statute.' Agencies are presumed to be
expert in the use of evidence.2 Hearsay may be admitted,3 but there is a
conflict as to whether a finding can be predicated solely on hearsay evidence.
4
The courts which do not permit such a finding follow the residuum nile
developed by New YorkP By this reasoning hearsay is admissible, but there
I. Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941); 60 Stat. 241, 5 U.S.C.
§ 1006(c) (1946) (provides for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repeti-
tious material).
2. Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Commission, 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376
(1943); 1 WICMORE, EVIDENCE 36 (3d ed. 1940).
3. Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 230 (1938); NLRB v. Cities
Service Oil Co., 129 F.2d 933 ,2d Cir. 1942); Oughton v. NLRB, 118 F.2d 486 (3d
Cir. 1941), cert. denied 315 U.S. 797 (1942); Superior Engraving Co. v. NLRB, 183
F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1950) (it may be proper to exclude hearsay).
4. Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied 338
U.S. 860, rehearing denied 339 U.S. 945 (1950); Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 68
App. D.C. 292, 96 F.2d 564, 566 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (interviews taken by examiner in
ascertaining need for a new radio station were hearsay, and finding could not be based
upon it); North Alabama Motor Express, Inc. v. Rookis, 244 Ala. 137, 12 So.2d 183
(1943); Waiver v. City of San Gabriel, 20 Cal.2d 879, 129 P.2d 349 (1942) (hearsay
insufficient to support the revocation of a license); Ceegan v. Unemployment Compensa-
tion Commission, 76 A.2d 116 (Del. 1950) (board not allowed to base decision on letter
from employment officer Florida, that applicant had not sought work in Florida); Durkin
v. A. H. Luecht & Co., 379 I1l. 227, 40 N.E.2d 69 (1942); State ex rel DeWeese v. Mor-
ris, 221 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. 1949); Glen Alden Coal Co. v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 168 Pa. Super. 534, 79 A.2d (1952). Contra: Montana Power Co. v.
FPC, 185 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cin. 1950) (old newspaper accounts, while hearsay, were sub-
stantial and probative and a finding could be based on such); Ellers v. Railroad Retirement
Board, 132 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1943) (if evidence is of a kind on which fair minded
men are accustomed to rely, it can support a finding); see NLRB v. Remington Rand,
94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied 304 U.S. 576 (mere rumor will not sup-
port a finding, but hearsay may do so if more is not conveniently available, and if in the
end, the finding is supported by the kind of evidence on which responsible persons are
accustomed to rely in serious affairs, L. Hand, J.).
5. Matter of Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 440, 113 N.E. 507,
509 (1916), 1 WiemoRE, EVieNcr 30 (3d ed. 1940).
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must be corroboration by judicially competent evidence to support the
finding.0
This rule has been followed in cases involving federal agencies.7  An
administrative order may be set aside only if unsupported by substantial
evidence. 8 Dictum of the United States Supreme Court has stated that
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor would not constitute substantial evidence.9
A deportation order, based mainly on hearsay, was set aside as being insuffi-
cient evidence to deprive an individual of a valuable privilege. 10
The residuum rule has been liberally applied in some workmen's com-
pensation cases where facts, circumstances, or inferences, together with hear-
say, are allowed to support a finding." A finding, however, cannot be based
solely on hearsay.' 2 Hearsay is used to supplement or explain the compe-
tent evidence.'
3
The principle case followed the more strict view in the acceptance of
hearsay, but the evidence was sufficient to indicate that a letter had been
6. Reynolds v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority, 276 App. Div. 388, 94
N.Y.S.2d 841 (1950); Yates v. Mulrooney, 245 App. Div. 146, 281 N.Y.Supp. 216 (1935)
(the fact that three bottles of the same brand of liquor were open in a tavern, together
with a hearsay letter from manufacturer was sufficient to show liquor had been diluted);
Matter of Carroll v. Knicerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 440, 113 N.E. 507, 509 (1916).
7. NLRB v. Service Wood Heel Co., 124 F.2d 470 (Ist Cir. 1941) (weak corrob-
oration made hearsay trustworthy); Oughton v. NLRB, 118 F.2d 486 (3d Cir. 1941), cert.
denied 315 U.S. 797 (1942); Union Drawn Steel Co. v. NLRB, 109 F.2d 587 (3d Cir.
1940) (weak corroboration from circumstantial evidence); NLRB v. Bell Oil & Gas Co.,
98 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1938), see Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 230
(1938). .,Contra: Ellers v. Railroad Retirement Board, 132 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1943);
John Bene and Sons, Inc. v. F'C, 299 Fed. 468 (2d Cir. 1924) (evidence though legally
incompetent, if of the kind that usually affects fair-minded men in the conduct of their
affairs, should be considered); Montana Power Co. v. FPC, 185 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir.
1950); see NLRB v. Remington Rand, 94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir. 1938).
8. 60 STAT. 243, 5 U.S.C. § 100 9(e) (1946); Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305
U.S. 197 (1939); Union Drawn Steel Co. v. NLRB, 109 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1940); Inter-
national Ass'n v. NLRB, 71 App. D.C. 175, 110 F.2d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1938), affirnned
311 U.S. 72 (1940) (only convincing evidence, not lawyers' evidence is required).
9. See Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 230 (1938).
10. Bridges v. WVixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (a stricter interpretation of evidence
rules is applied in deportation proceedings).
11. Associated General Contractors v. Cardillo, 70 App. D.C. 303, 106 F.2d 327
D.C. Cir. 1938); American Security Co. v. Minard, 118 Ind. App. 310, 77 N.E.2d 762
1948); DeLong v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 229 Iowa 700, 295 N.W. 91 (1941);
Altschuler v. Bressler, 289 N.Y. 463, 46 N.E. 2d 886 (1943) ( distinguished from Carroll
v. Knickerbocker on the basis of circumstances in each case); Maley v. Thomasville Furni-
ture Co., 214 N.C. 589, 200 S.E. 438 (1939); Ham v. Mullins Lumber Co., 193 S.C. 66,
7 S.E.2d 712 (1940); American Furniture Co. v. Graves, 141 Va 1, 126 S.E. 213 (1925)
(vague circumstances were sufficient corroboration).
12. Libby, McNeill and Libby v. Alaska Industrial Board, 191 F.2d 260 (9th Cir.
1951), cert, denied 342 U.S. 913 (1952); Peoria Cordage Co. v. Industrial Board of Ill.,
284 II1. 90, 119 N.E. 96 (1918); Reck v. Whittlesberger, 181 Mich. 463, 148 N.W. 247
(1914); Andricsak v. National Fireproofing Corp., 3 N.J. 466, 70 A.2d 750 (1950);
Matter of Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 440, 113 N.E. 507, 509
(1916); Johnson v. Payne-Yost Construction Co., 292 Pa. 509, 141 AtI. 481 (1928);
Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Comm'n, 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376 (1942).
13. Libby, McNeill and Libby v. Alaska Industrial Board, 191 F.2d 260 (9th Cir.
1951), cert. denied 342 U.S. 913 (1952); Maley v. Thomasville Furniture Co., 214 N.C.
589, 200 S.E. 438 (1939); Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Comm'n, 102 Utah 492, 132
P.2d 376 (1943).
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mailed to plaintiff. The case follows the authority of a previous New Jersey
case which denied workmen's compensation because the only available evi-
dence was hearsay, thus denying the right of the workman's beneficiary. 4
Perhaps a better rule in cases of this type would permit reliance on sub-
stantial hearsay when legally competent evidence is not available.'5  By
requiring agencies to follow outmoded rules of evidence, justice is often de-
nied, especially in workmen's compensation cases. Administrative findings
should be permitted on reliable, trustworthy evidence, regardless of technical
common law admissibility.'
William A. Ingraham
COURTS-CIRCUIT JUDGES-EFFECT OF :RROR IN
EN BANC PROCEEDINGS
The defendant circuit judge issued a search warrant and pursuant to
statutory provisions,' appointed an elisor to serve it. The plaintiff sheriff
filed a declaratory bill and requested the circuit, excepting the defendant, 2
to hear the cause en bane. The senior Judge3 then assigned the cause to five
judges within the circuit. One of the judges recused himself, convinced an
en bane proceeding would be contrary to law and result in reversible error.
The recusant then asserted that the judgment of one circuit judge is the
determination of the judicial circuit under the Florida Constitution.4
Sullivan v. Milledge, 2 Fla. Supp. 125 (lth Cir. Ct. 1949).
Where the constitution provides for more than one judge in a particular
circuit," the questions to be resolved are:
1. Is it reversible error, under existing law, and in the disposition
14.Andricsak v. National Fireproofing Corp., 3 N.J. 466, 70 A.2d 750 (1950).
I5. See NLRB v. Remington Rand, 94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 304
U.S. 576 (1938).
16. 1 V MORE, EviDENCE 41-42 (3d ed. 1940) (residuum rule is not wise and
satisfactory for general adoption).
1. FLA. STAT. § 47.12 (1951) .... A justice of the peace or a constable, in the
respective counties, may serve all process in cases where the sheriff is interested, and in
cases of necessity the judge of the circuit court may appoint an elisor to act instead of
the sheriff.
2. Since the conflict arpsc between the sheriff and defendant Circuit Judge, plaintiff
felt said Judge ought to be excepted.
3. FLA. CONST. Art. 5, § 43. . . . Wherever there are two or more Circuit Judges
appointed for a Circuit the business may be divided among the Circuit Judges . . . as may
be prescribed by law, and where no provision has been made by law, the distribution of
the business of the Circuit between the Circuit Judges of the Circuit, . . . and the allot-
ment or assignment of matters and cases to he heard, decided, ordered, tried, decreed or
adjudged, shall be controlled or made when necessary by the Circuit Judge holding the
commission earliest in date ...
4. FLA. CONST. Art. 5, § 43. The Legislature may from time to time . . . provide
for the appointment of one or more additional Circuit Judges for such Circuit. . . . He
shall have all the powers and perform all the duties that are or may be provided or pre-
scribed by the Constitution or by statute . . . and all statutes concerning Circuit Judges
shall apply to him.
5. Ibid. State ex Tel. Palmer v. Atkinson, 116 Fla. 366, 156 So. 726 (1934).
